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Traditionally, a country’s electoral system requires the voter to vote at a specific day and
place, which conflicts with the mobility usually seen in modern live styles. Thus, the
widespread of Internet (mobile) broadband access can be seen as an opportunity to deal
with this mobility problem, i.e. the adoption of an Internet voting system can make the live
of voter’s much more convenient; however, a widespread Internet voting systems adoption
relies on the ability to develop trustworthy systems, i.e. systems that are verifiable and
preserve the voter’s privacy. Building such a system is still an open research problem.
Our contribution is a new Internet voting system: EVIV, a highly sound End-to-end Veri-
fiable Internet Voting system, which offers full voter’s mobility and preserves the voter’s
privacy from the vote casting PC even if the voter votes from a public PC, such as a PC at
acybercafe´ or atapublic library.Additionally, EVIVhasprivatevoteverificationmechanisms,
inwhich thevoter just has toperformasimplematchof two small strings (4e5 alphanumeric
characters), that detect and protect against vote manipulations both at the insecure vote
client platform and at the election server side.
ª 2012 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.1. Introduction The biggest challenges of Internet voting are the voter’sIn spite of the fact that Internet voting presents risks to the
voter’s privacy and the election’s integrity, evidence seems to
point out that Internet voting has come to stay. According to
the Krimmer et al. (2007) study, numerous Internet elections
(w140) had already occurred worldwide, and many of them
(w40%) were actual real binding elections. These numbers
have been increasing as more countries perform trials or
adopt the Internet voting channel. Notable examples are the
Switzerland and Estonia cases which are moving to/already
have national binding Internet elections. A more recent
example is Norway which had a trial on an Internet voting
system in the 2011 local government elections (Ministry of
Local Government and Regional Development, 2012).de Lisboa, Instituto Su
351 939457621.
.pt (R. Joaquim), paulo.fer
ier Ltd. All rights reserveprivacy and coercion issues at the uncontrolled voting envi-
ronment and the (in)secure platform problem, i.e. the (in)
security of the vote casting PC that can be the home or office
computer of even a computer at a cybercafe´ or at a public
library (Jefferson et al., 2004; Kiayias et al., 2006; Dagstuhl
Accord, 2007). Usually, Internet voting systems require trust
on the vote client platform (the vote casting PC ) to give some
guarantees of voter’s privacy and election’s integrity;
however, this is not easily achievable given that vote casting
PCs are in uncontrolled environments and often vulnerable to
a number of attacks (e.g. virus, worms, phishing).
EVIV addresses the voter’s privacy at the vote casting PC in
addition to the insecure platform problem. EVIV allows for re-
voting (cast multiple votes) which may address weak forms ofperior de Engenharia de Lisboa, ADEETC, R. Conselheiro Emı´dio
reira@inesc-id.pt (P. Ferreira), carlos.ribeiro@ist.utl.pt (C. Ribeiro).
d.
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attacks.
The design of EVIV is driven by the following goal: create
a fully mobile End-to-End (E2E) verifiable Internet voting
system that protects the voter’s privacy from the vote casting
PC. From this goal we have derived the following requisites:
1. EVIV must enable the voter to vote privately even from
public PCs on election day, e.g. a PC at a cybercafe´ or at
a public library.
2. EVIV must have privacy preserving voter recorded-as-
intended verification, i.e. it must allow the voter to verify
that her recorded vote accurately represents her choices
without revealing her vote intention nor relying on any
trusted hardware/software, e.g. the hardware/software
that creates the electronic vote.
3. EVIV must provide privacy preserving universal counted-
as-recorded verification1 i.e. e allows anyone to verify
that the final tally is the accurate sum of all the valid
recorded votes while preserving the voters’ privacy.
4. EVIV must not impose mobility restrictions to the voters.
These requisites define the high level characteristics that
differentiate EVIV from other E2E verifiable Internet voting
systems: EVIV, to our knowledge, is the first E2E verifiable
Internet voting system that offers full mobility to the voter
and preserves the voter’s privacy from the vote casting PC (cf.
Section 7).
To achieve the above described goal/requisites, the EVIV
vote protocol combines a code voting protocol (Chaum, 2001;
Oppliger, 2002) with the MarkPledge cryptographic voter’s
verifiable vote encryption technique (Neff, 2004; Adida and
Neff, 2009; Joaquim and Ribeiro, 2012). The code voting
protocol preserves the vote’s privacy from the vote casting PC
because thevoteruses secret vote codes to select thecandidate;
on the other hand, the MarkPledge vote encryption technique
allows the voter to verify, with a very high soundness, that her
vote is cast and recorded-as-intended, performing just a simple
match of two small strings (4e5 alphanumeric characters).
Additionally, the vote encryption used in EVIV also supports
well known universal counted-as-recorded verification tech-
niques, e.g. verifiable homomorphic vote tally, cf. Section 3.1.3.
One important, and also differentiating, aspect of EVIV is
that its code voting protocol does not rely on a centralized vote
codes distribution. In EVIV the vote codes are not used to
communicate the voter’s choice to a remote election server;
instead, in EVIV every voter has a voter security token (VST ),
which is responsible for the vote encryption, and to which the
voter communicates her candidate selection. With the help of
the VST, each voter generates the vote codes at home, which
facilitates the logistics of the election and allows for a full
online and mobile voting process.
The use of the VST to perform the vote encryption has the
additional advantage of protecting the voter’s privacy from the
election server(s), which is a common problem of code voting
systems (cf. Section 7). On the other hand, the limited
computational capabilities of theVST are an extra challenge to1 A system with both recorded-as-intended and counted-as-
recorded, verifications is said to by E2E verifiable.the system implementation. To address this challenge we
have developed MarkPledge 3 (Joaquim and Ribeiro, 2012), cf.
Section 3.1, which is the less computational demanding
specification of the MarkPledge technique and therefore suit-
able for computational constrained devices, such as the VST.
For simplicity we assume that the VST is a smart card or
a USB security token; however, the VST may also be a secure
element inside a smartphone, e.g. a specific security domain
within a UICC (Universal Integrated Security Card); in this case
the PC role is performed by the smartphone, whichmeans that
the voter may vote anywhere using her smartphone.
Summarizing, this paper contribution is a new voting
system (EVIV) that gives the voter full mobility and allow her
to vote privately in public computers without compromising
the integrity of her vote.
Thenext section gives anoverviewof the EVIV vote protocol
and the privacy and integrity trust models. Section 3 describes
the main EVIV protocol building blocks. Then, Section 4
describes in detail the EVIV system architecture and vote
protocol. The EVIV vote protocol is evaluated in Section 5.
Section 6describes theEVIVprototype implementation results.
An overview of the related work is given in Section 7. Finally,
Section 8 gives the conclusions and future work directions.2. EVIV overview and trust models
In the design of EVIV we assume that each voter has a unique
VST. It is assumed that once a person reaches the legal age to
vote she goes to the local authorities and enrolls in official
voters list. After the enrollment, the person (now also a voter)
gets a digital voter identification token, i.e. the VST, that
contains a unique cryptographic key pair (e.g. RSA key pair)
which is used to authenticate the voter in subsequent elec-
tions, until the key pair expires.
After becoming a registered voter the EVIV electoral
process for every election is the following:
1. A fewweeksbefore theelectionday, thevoter insertsherVST
intoaPCandconnects to theElectionRegistrar service; there,
thevoter registers tovoteonlineonthe forthcomingelection.
After a successful registration the voter’s VST creates a code
card, containing one vote code for each candidate and
a single vote confirmation code, which is printed using
a printer connected to the PC. Each vote code and the
confirmation code is a small (4e5 characters) text string.
2. On election day, cf. Fig. 1, the voter inserts her VST into a PC
and enters her chosen candidate vote code in the PC that
sends it to the VST (step ⓐ), which then prepares the vote
encryption and a vote receipt; both are sent to the Ballot
Box service through the PC (stepⓑ). The PC shows the vote
receipt, containing one verification code for each candidate,
to the voter that checks it by verifying that the verification
code of the selected candidate matches the confirmation
code in her code card (stepⓒ).
3. After the end of the Internet election period, all vote
encryptions and vote receipts are made public on a public
Bulletin Board. Every voter can then confirm that her vote
was cast and recorded-as-intended by checking that her
vote receipt is published on the Bulletin Board.
Fig. 1 e Candidate selection and receipt verification overview. In this example the voter selects the candidate Dharma with
the vote code RCP3. Then, the VST creates the vote encryption and receipt and sends them to the Ballot Box through the PC.
The voter gets and verifies the vote receipt by checking that the confirmation code on her code card (PZ8R) is the verification
code of the candidate Dharma in the vote receipt.
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preserving and verifiable way, from the data published in
the Bulletin Board. The tally and corresponding correctness
proofs are also published in the Bulletin Board, allowing
anyone to verify the correctness of the election tally (e.g.
independent election observer organizations).
2.1. Properties and trust models
The EVIV vote protocol demands some changes in the usual
voter’s electoral process interaction; namely, it requires a pre-
election registration and a simple visual vote receipt verifi-
cation. These changes and the cryptographic techniques used
in the EVIV vote protocol, cf. Section 4.3, gives EVIV the
following four properties, which are proven in Appendix B:
P1EVIV e No votes can be added, deleted or modified without
detection.
P2EVIV e Every vote is counted-as-recorded.
P3EVIV e Every voter can verify that her vote is recorded-as-
intended with a soundness of ð1 2aÞr$ðk1Þ.2
P4EVIV e No one but the voter and her VST knows the voter’s
chosen candidate.
EVIV guarantees election integrity, i.e. properties P1EVIV,
P2EVIV and P3EVIV, against a single malicious entity (system
component or system player) or a collusion of malicious
entities under the following Integrity Assumptions (AI):
AI1_EVIV: There is at least one honest trustee among a set of
chosen trustees.3
AI2_EVIV: At least one honest organization or entity with
cryptographic capabilities will verify the correctness of all the
data used in the tally.2 The protocol security parameters r and a are discussed in
Sections 4.3.3 and 3.1.2 respectively. k is the number of running
candidates.
3 The Trustees are defined in Section 4.1.The privacy of the voter (P4EVIV) is protected against
a single malicious entity or a collusion of malicious entities,
even if the voter votes in a public computer, under the
following Privacy Assumptions (AP):
AP1_EVIV: There is no collusion of more than t out of n trustees,
where t and n are configurable security parameters.
AP2_EVIV: The VST (which performs the vote encryption) does
not disclose the voters’ vote choices.
AP3_EVIV: Only the VST and the voter have knowledge of the
vote codes. This assumption implies that the PC used to create
the vote codes does not store or disclose them. Note, however,
that the vote codes generation may be performed at any
chosen time by the voter, long before the election day, and
even using an offline PC, cf. Section 4.4.3. Building blocks
This Section describes two building blocks used in the EVIV
protocol, namely the MarkPledge 3 vote encryption technique
and the shared random number generation protocol.
3.1. MarkPledge 3
Due to its complexity, the details of the MarkPledge technique
are left outside of the EVIV protocol description. Any of the
MarkPledge specifications (Neff, 2004; Adida and Neff, 2009;
JoaquimandRibeiro,2012)canbeusedwithEVIV;however,EVIV
requires the execution of the main cryptographic functions of
the MarkPledge technique in a computational constrained
device (i.e. the VST ). Consequently, this section describes the
MarkPledge 3 (MP3) specification which is the only viable solu-
tion to implement MarkPledge, and therefore EVIV, in
a computational constraineddevice (JoaquimandRibeiro, 2012).
We start by providing an overview of the MarkPledge
technique before entering in the details of MP3. Every vote
protocol that uses the MarkPledge technique must follow the
following steps (possibly in a different order):
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for the selected candidate and independent NOvote
encryptions for each of the not selected candidates. Both
the YESvote and theNOvotes are created using the candidate
Vote Encryption function VEpk, which also inserts a random
confirmation code in each of the candidate encryptions.4
2. Pledge/commit the YESvote confirmation code to the voter.
3. Create a random vote encryption challenge value after the
vote encryption.
4. Create a vote receipt comprised by one verification code for
each candidate (cf. Fig. 1), based on the vote encryption and
on the random challenge, using the candidate Receipt
Creation function RCpk.
5. Voter visual verification that the pledged/committed YES-
vote confirmation code is the verification code of the
selected candidate on the vote receipt.
6. Verify thevalidityofboth thevoteencryptionandvotereceipt
using, respectively, the candidate VoteValidity functionVVpk
and the candidate Receipt Validity functionRVpk.
7. Perform a vote canonicalization of the vote encryption,
using the candidate Vote Canonicalization function Cpk, and
count the votes.
The creation of the challenge value, in step 3, depends of
the vote protocol. In the EVIV case we use the shared random
number generation protocol described in Section 3.2. The
functions referred in 1, 4, 6, and 7 for MP3 are described in
detail in Joaquim and Ribeiro (2012). For completeness, the
following section provides a brief insight into each of the
functions internals as well as their main properties. The
length of the confirmation code, verification codes and vote
encryption challenge is defined by the MarkPledge security
parameter a, usually to a value between 20 and 30 bits (4e5
characters string).
3.1.1. MarkPledge 3 functions details
In the description below all encryptions are performed using
the exponential variant of the ElGamal cryptosystem with the
public cryptographic key parameters p, q and g and the elec-
tion public key pk, cf. Appendix A.
3.1.1.1. Candidate vote encryption function VEpk.
VEpkðb;q;rÞ¼hcvote¼hu;vi;voteValidityi
¼u¼Epkðb;sÞ;v¼Epkðq;dÞ;voteValidity
An MP3 candidate vote encryption cvote¼hu;vi is composed
by two independent encryptions: u is the encryption of either
b ¼ 1 for a YESvote or b ¼ 1 for a NOvote; v is the encryption of
a random confirmation (commit) code ðq˛RZqÞ, which in the
case of a YESvote is pledged to the voter.5
Both encryptions use exponential ElGamal with the
randomization factors s and d derived from the input value
r ¼ s k d. The voteValidity data proves that u is an ElGamal
exponential encryption of a value b˛f1; 1g. In MP3, the4 The specific way in which this code is encoded in the candi-
date encryption is different on each MP.
5 For usability reasons, only a bits of the confirmation code (q)
value is pledged to the voter, cf. Section 3.1.2.voteValidity data is the output of the ballot validity proof
protocol of Cramer et al. (1997).
3.1.1.2. Candidate receipt creation function RCpk.
RCpkðb; q; s; d; cÞ ¼ hw;ui
w ¼

q if b ¼ 1 ðYESvoteÞ
2$c qmod q if b ¼ 0 ðNOvoteÞ
u ¼ s$ðc wÞ þ dmod q
TheRCpkfunction generates a receipt, i.e. a verification code
w. It outputs the confirmation code q, if the cvote is a YESvote, or
outputs the q symmetric value, taking c as the symmetry axis,
if the cvote is a NOvote. The u data is the combination of the
randomization factors used in the (cvote) u and v encryptions,
which is needed to verify that the verification equation results
in an encryption of the challenge value c, as described by the
RVpkfunction below. In order to work in accordance with the
ElGamal homomorphic properties, both the w and u values are
computed mod q.
The output of the RCpkfunction acts as a window into the
encrypted vote, ensuring the voter that the vote machine
encrypted the vote correctly, i.e. it encrypted hers intents.
Provided that the vote is encrypted and the voter is informed
of the chosen q before c is disclosed, it is not possible to the
entity using the function (the VST) to produce anything but
the q for the chosen candidate and some unpredictable value
(before knowing c) to the remaining candidates.
3.1.1.3. Candidate vote validity function VVpk. The candidate
vote validity function corresponds to the ballot validity proof in
Cramer et al. (1997), VVpkðcvote ¼ hu;vi; voteValidityÞ ¼
fTrue; Falseg. It isusedtoensure that theucomponentof the cvote
is in fact theencryptionofb¼ 1orb¼1, i.e. it isavalid cvote. The
functionoutputsTrue if the cvote isvalidandFalseotherwise.This
function can be used in the middle of the voting process, to
ensure the correctness of the vote as soon as possible, or at the
end of the election, before the vote counting process.
3.1.1.4. Candidate receipt validity function RVpk.
RVpkðcvote ¼ hu;vi; c;w;uÞ ¼ RVpk
Epkðb; sÞ; Epkðq; dÞ; c;w;u
¼ Epkðc;uÞ¼? ucw$v
The receipt validity function corresponds to the zero
knowledge validation of the verification code w, which can be
conducted by any trusted third party by verifying that ucw$v is
the encryption of c, without any special knowledge but the
public values. This is possible by a reconstruction of the
encryption of c using the u encryption factor, revealed by the
RCpk function. Formore details on themath behind the receipt
verification please refer to Joaquim and Ribeiro (2012).
3.1.1.5. Candidate vote canonicalization function Cpk.
Cpkðcvote ¼ hu;vi; c;wÞ ¼ u ¼ Epkðb; sÞ ¼ canonicalVote
The MP3 candidate vote canonicalization goal is to strip the
vote from any identifying marks before it is count. The n part
contains the confirmation code q, which is a number with
traceability features once decrypted, but u is just the encryp-
tion of b˛f1; 1g that depends only on the vote type and
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tion consists only in striping the vote from everything except
the encrypted vote type (Yes or No vote).
3.1.2. Adjusting the voter’s view of MP3 output to the
a parameter
The MarkPledge technique has the security parameter a that
defines the length of the verification and confirmation codes.
Usually, a is set to a value between 20 and 30,whichmeans that
the votermust compare 4e5 character strings. However, inMP3
the challenge (c), the verification code (w) and the confirmation
code (q) domains, are defined by the cryptosystem parameter q
and not by a. Since the size of q is in the hundreds of bits range
weclearlyhaveausability issue.Tosolve thisusability issue it is
proposed a change in the voter’s view of the MP3 functions
output, namely the voter’s view of both the verification code w
and the confirmation code q should be truncated to a bits by
applying the mod 2a operation to the referred values.
Assuming a uniform and random distribution of w and q
over Zq, the voter verification has a statistical soundness of
1  2a, just because q\2a, i.e. the voter still performs the
verification of a random value uniformly distributed over Z2a ,
cf. (Joaquim and Ribeiro, 2012).
Note that in EVIV the size of the challenge is not a problem
because it is generated without the voter’s collaboration, cf.
Section 4.3.
3.1.3. Homomorphic vote tally
MP3 allows the use of an efficient homomorphic vote tally
process, using and independent homomorphic vote aggrega-
tion for each candidate. Thus, instead of decrypting each vote
before counting it, it is performed the homomorphic addition
of every encrypted vote votej ¼ cvotej1 k cvotej2 k. k cvoteðbÞjk,
where cvoteji ¼ hu
j
i; v
j
ii; j ¼ 1.n, n is the number of valid votes
and k is the number of candidates in each vote.
Given that the vote validity function VVpk ensures that each
uji ¼ Epkð1Þ or u
j
i ¼ Epkð1Þ, then the vote counting for candidate
i will be counti ¼ n þ di/2, where di is the decryption of the
homomorphic addition 4nj¼1u
j
i. However, to ensure democ-
racy, the protocol must also guarantee that each vote is
counted for only one candidate, which means that the system
must ensure that there is only one uji ¼ Epkð1Þ in each vote (the
sumValidity proof in the EVIV protocol, cf. Section 4.3). Once
again, given that each uji is the encryption of the value 1 or 1,
it is only necessary to prove that4ki¼1u
j
i ¼ Epkð2 kÞ, e.g. using
the Chaum and Pedersen (1992) protocol for proving the
equality of discrete logarithms, or by revealing the sum of the
encryption factors of the uji elements, as suggested for the
validation of the c encryption in the RCpk and RVpk functions.
3.2. Shared random number generation protocol
To ensure the randomness and freshness of the challenge
used in EVIV protocol, we use a simple two round random
number generation protocol conducted by a set of trustees T .
The protocol steps are as follows:
1. In the first step each trustee ti˛T secretly generates
a random number ri and commits to it by publishing
a signed hash of ri on a public bulletin board.2. After the commitment of all trustees, each trustee reveals
its random number. Then, all trustees verify the correct-
ness of the commitments published in the first step. If all
commitments are correct, the shared random number is
computed by applying a bitwise exclusive or to all the
random numbers ri generated by the trustees.
The random generation process is monitored by the elec-
toral commission that validates the process by signing the
final generated number and all messages that originated it. It
is obvious that if one trustee is honest the random number
generated will be fresh and random.4. EVIV system description
The description of EVIV starts by presenting the system
players and their responsibilities (Section 4.1); it continues
with the description of the system components and their
functionality within the system architecture (Section 4.2);
finally Section 4.3 outlines the vote protocol phases. For all
these sections please refer to Fig. 2.4.1. EVIV system players
The EVIV system has four system players: the electoral
commission, the voter, the trustees and independent
organizations.
Electoral Commission (not represented in Fig. 2) is the
entity responsible for the entire electoral process; namely, the
Electoral Commission is responsible for the voters enrollment
system, the actual voting system and the authentication of all
election public data.
Voter is any citizen with the right to vote. The voter must
enroll once with the Electoral Commission, and for every
election perform an online registration to be able to vote
online on election day. Besides voting, the voter may also
verify if her vote is cast and recorded-as-intended by per-
forming a simple string match.
Trustees exist in order to share the control over the voter’s
privacy and the election’s integrity among several entities.
The trustees can be the political parties and/or any other
authorized entity (e.g. an election observer non governmental
organization).
Independent Organizations are responsible for indepen-
dently validate the correctness of the election public data. The
immediate candidates for these organizations are the entities
directly interested in the election outcome, e.g. political
parties; however, any person/organization can perform the
role of an Independent Organization and verify the validity
and correctness of the election, provided that it has the
computational means to do it.4.2. EVIV architecture
The EVIV architecture is constituted by the Enrollment
Service, the Election Registrar, the Ballot Box, the Bulletin
Board, the Verification Service, the VST and the vote client
platform (PC ).
Fig. 2 e Overview of the EVIV vote protocol phases. The phases are presented clockwise starting at the left upper corner with
the voter enrollment phase.
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process of every voter. The enrollment process is the process
by which each voter is assigned a security token (VST ). After
enrollment the voter may participate in several elections until
the assigned VST expires.
Election Registrar provides the election registration service
that allows voters to register for voting online on a particular
election.
Ballot Box provides the vote casting service on election day.
The Ballot Box service performs the voter authentication and
a vote encryption correctness verification before accepting the
vote.
Bulletin Board is the service responsible for the publication
of all election public data. The data published cannot be
deleted and is always authenticated, i.e. digitally signed.
Verification Service is a service that verifies the correction
and validity of votes and receipts. Each independent organi-
zation should run an instance of the verification service.
Voter Security Token (VST ) is the entity responsible for the
vote encryption and the voter’s authentication by means of
digital signature (the voter’s private key is inside the VST ).
Client Platform (PC ) is the PC(s) or any other kind of
interaction machine with a VST reader (e.g. mobile phone,
pda) together with the corresponding operating system and
programs used by the voter during the vote protocol.
EVIV supports several instances (possibly on different
entities/servers) of all services. In EVIV this is easy because, cf.
Section 4.3, all data used to setup the election and compute
the election tally is public and authenticated (even the
encrypted votes) which facilitates the application of loadbalancing and fault tolerance techniques. Note also that, the
first four services (Enrollment, Election Registrar, Ballot Box
and Bulletin Board) may even be run by the same entity/server
given that the system is immune to their collusion. This
ensures that EVIV may be used from very small elections with
just one server, to very large elections with every service
replicated many times ensuring both scalability and immu-
nity to lock out problems.
Under the trust models assumptions described in Section
2.1, in EVIV, and with respect to the voter’s privacy, we
assume that the VST and a configurable threshold of trustees
(that share the election private key) are honest. On the other
hand, regarding the election integrity, we only assume that
there is one honest Trustee and one honest Verification
Service accessible to the voter.
4.3. EVIV protocol
The EVIV’s vote protocol builds on top of a shared threshold
ElGamal election key pair, cf. Appendix A. The private election
key is shared by a set of trustees T in such a way that only the
cooperation of a (configurable) set of t trustees is able to decrypt
amessage encryptedwith the election public key. The votes are
encrypted, under the election public key, using the MarkPledge
technique.
EVIV’s vote protocol is divided in four phases (cf. Fig. 2): 1 e
the voter enrollment phase; 2 e the election registration
phase; 3 e the vote casting phase; and 4 e the public verifi-
cation and vote counting phase. The following sections detail
these four phases.
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The voter enrollment phase consists of an off-line enrollment
process where the voter, through the Enrollment Service,
identifies herself to the Electoral Commission and receives her
VSTwith the voter’s private key and a certificate signed by the
Electoral Commission. The voter can then use her VST to vote
in all subsequent elections. The public output of the vote
enrollment phase is the publication of a list of all voters’
certificates in the Bulletin Board.
1. V/Enrollment Service : voterCredentials
To be able to vote the voter ðVÞ must be registered in the
electoral roll. This registration is usually performed in
person at the local authorities offices using the Enrollment
Service provided by the Electoral Commission. The voter
starts the enrollment process by going into a local authority
office and presenting her credentials, i.e. an identity proof.
2. Enrollment Service/V : VST
After verifying the voter’s identity, the Enrollment
Service assigns a VST to the voter, e.g. a smart card. The
VST contains a private key, and the corresponding public
key certificate issued by the Electoral Commission. The
VST key pair is generated inside the VST, thus is only
known to it. The VST key pair now becomes the voter’s key
pair.
3. EC/ BB: {electoralRoll}EC
At some predetermined time before the election, the
Electoral Commission (EC ) uses the Enrollment Service to
create the electoral roll, containing the list of voters and
corresponding public keys. The electoral roll is signed and
published on the public Bulletin Board (BB).
4.3.2. Election registration phase
The election registration phase is done sometime before the
election (e.g. a month), and is divided into two stages. First,
there is a setup stage (performed by the Electoral Commission
and by the Trustees) to setup election public information/
parameters (e.g. candidate list and election key pair). Then,
there is a ballot registration stage, where each voter registers
her ballot.
4.3.2.1. Election setup stage
1. EC/ BB: {electionParameters}EC, {candidateList}EC
The election registration phase starts with the Electoral
Commission publishing in the Bulletin Board the election
candidate list and the public election parameters, such as:
the election date and the election security parameters (e.g.
election key pair parameters, cf. Appendix A).
2. T/BB : fkeyGenerationData;pkgT
The second step in the election registration phase is the
creation of a shared threshold ElGamal election key pair by
the set of Trustees T , cf. Appendix A.1. The inputs (crypto-
graphic key parameters)messages, the public outputs of the
key generation protocol and the election public key ( pk) are
published in the public Bulletin Board. Each trustee signs
her messages before sending them to the Bulletin Board.
3. EC/ BB: {pk}EC
The Electoral Commission verifies the election public key
generation data, published by the Trustees, and validatesthe election public key by signing and publishing it on the
Bulletin Board.
The voters can now start registering to participate in the
election.
4.3.2.2. Ballot registration stage. The voter registers herself to
participate in the election by creating and registering a ballot.
The process starts with the voter connecting her VST to an
Internet connected PC and establishing a secure connection to
the Election Registrar (SSL/TLS connection). In this connec-
tion, the voter is authenticated by digital signature means
using her private key inside the VST, which may require
the introduction of a PIN. Then, the following takes place
(cf. Fig. 3).
1. ER/ PC/ VST: {candidateList}EC, {pk}EC
First, the Election Registrar (ER) sends the candidate
list and the election public key to the VST.
2. VST/PC/ER : fballotgV
The VST creates the voter’s ballot, signs it with the
voter’s private key (which is inside the VST ), and sends
it to the Election Registrar using the PC Internet
connection.
An EVIV ballot is comprised of k candidate vote
encryptions (cvotei, i ¼ 1.k), in a random order, and the
corresponding voteValidity proofs, where k is the number
of candidates. Each cvotei and corresponding voteValidityi
proof are created by the MarkPledge vote encryption
ðVEpkÞ function, cf. Section 3.1.
VEpkðbi; qi; riÞ ¼

cvotei; voteValidityi

where bi, qi and ri are input parameters defining the
candidate vote type (bi ¼ 1 / NOvote;
bi ¼ 1/ YESvote) and the secret values needed to verify
the vote (qi and ri).
In the ballot there are k  1 independent NOvotes
(bisj ¼ 1) and one YESvote (bj ¼ 1). Additionally, the
ballot has a sumValidity data proving that there is only
one YESvote entry in the ballot, cf. Section 3.1.3.
ballot ¼ kki cvoteikki voteValidityi k sumValidity
Notice that, in order to transform the ballot into the vote it
is only necessary to rotate the ballot entries such that the
cvotej (theYESvote) entrybecomesalignedwith theselected
candidate, cf. Fig. 4, althoughat this time in theprotocolno
one but the VST knows the position of the YESvote in the
ballot, because none of the cvotes reveals its type.
3.
ER/BB : ffballotgVgER
ER/PC/VST : ffballotgVgER
Upon the ballot reception, the Election Registrar
verifies the ballot correctness by using the VVpkðcvotei;
voteValidityiÞ ¼ fTrue; Falseg function on each candidate
encryption to verify that they actually encrypt a value
bi˛f1;1g; and using the sumValidity data to verify that
there is only one which encrypts a value bj ¼ 1
Fig. 3 e Ballot registration stage interaction in the election registration phase.
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
cvotei; voteValidityi
¼? True (1)One Yes Voteðballot; sum ValidityÞ¼? True (2)
If both verifications succeed, the Election Registrar vali-
dates the ballot by signing and publishing it on the Bulletin
Board. The Election Registrar signature is also sent to the
VST as a proof of registration.
After this step the ballot is registered and the connection
to the Election Registrar is closed.
4. VST/PC/V : codeCard
Once the ballot registration is confirmed, theVST creates
a code card for the election. The code card is composed
of a vote code for each candidate (selected randomly) and
one confirmation code. The confirmation code must
correspond to the ballot’s YESvote secret value (qj). The
voter then prints the code card or writes it down on
a paper and removes the VST from the PC.
Note that the code card generation step does not require
a connection to any entity, i.e. it is performed offline. Thus,
as explained in Section 4.4, it could be performed in
another PC without an Internet connection (e.g. to better
protect the voter’s privacy).Fig. 4 e This figure illustrates the vote and receipt creation from
to apply to the ballot entries to align the YESvote to the selected
ballot/vote entries by the MP RCpk function.5. EC/ BB: {ballotList}EC
Finally, the Electoral Commission verifies all ballots
published in the Bulletin Board and validates them by
issuing a signature on the list of all published valid
ballots.
The Electoral Commission verifies the correctness of
each ballot the same way the Election Registrar verifies it
in the third step of the ballot registration stage.
4.3.3. Vote casting phase
The actual vote casting process can be performed anywhere,
including public places such as cybercafe´s and public libraries,
without compromising the voter’s privacy. The PC used to cast
a vote will not be able to know or change the voter’s choice;
however, the voter must still protect her privacy from other
people at the public place. Essentially, the votermust keep her
code card secret.
4.3.3.1. Vote casting initialization stage. Similarly to the elec-
tion registration phase, the vote casting phase is also divided
in two stages: the initialization stage and the actual vote
casting stage (cf. Fig. 5). The goal of the initialization stage is to
provide a fresh random election challenge, which is essential
to the correct use of the MarkPledge technique, and conse-
quently to the end-to-end verifiability of EVIV.the ballot entries. The vote is simply the rotation necessary
candidate. The receipt is the values computed from the
Fig. 5 e Vote casting phase interaction.
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The vote casting phase is initialized with an election
random number generated by the set of Trustees T (using
the distributed random number generation protocol
described in Section 3.2) which ensures a random and fresh
number provided that at least one trustee is honest.
The election randomnumber, and thedata thatoriginate it,
aresignedby theTrusteesandpublished intheBulletinBoard.
2. EC/ BB: {electionChallenge}EC
The Electoral Commission verifies the election random
number generation data and validates it by signing and
publishing the election challenge value:
electionChallenge ¼ HðrandomNumberkelectoral rollkballot listÞ
where H is a cryptographic hash function.
After the electionChallenge publication the voters can start
casting their votes.
4.3.3.2. Vote casting stage. The actual vote procedure starts
when the voter opens the vote client application, on an
Internet connected PC, and establishes a secure and authen-
ticated connection to the Ballot Box (SSL/TLS connection).
Then, the following takes place:
1. Ballot Box/ PC: {candidateList}EC, {electionChallenge}EC
The Ballot Box starts by sending the electionChallenge and
the list of candidates to the PC.
2. V/PC : voteCodej
The PC asks the voter to vote, which she does by typing
the vote code of her chosen candidate (voteCodej) that isfound in her code card next to her chosen candidate (can-
didatej) (stepⓐ in Fig. 6).
3. PC/ VST: voteCodej, {electionChallenge}EC
The PC then forwards the vote code and the election
challenge to the VST (stepⓑ in Fig. 6).
4. VST/PC/V : fvote;voteReceipt; receiptValiditygV
After receiving the vote code, and if the voteCodej is part of
the valid vote codes on the voter’s code card, the VST
prepares the voter’s vote and receipt from the corre-
sponding ballot and the electionChallenge value. This process
is illustrated in Fig. 4 and described next:
(a) First, theVST creates the vote by computing the rotation
necessary (l times) to apply to the ballot entries to align
the YESvote entry with the selected candidate. The
encrypted vote is simply the ballot entries rotation.
vote ¼
k
i
cvoteðiþlÞmod k
(b) Then, the VST computes the ballot challenge value c by
selecting a random number 0  z < r, and then
computing c ¼ FðelectionChallenge; zÞ:
FðelectionChallenge;zÞ ¼

electionChallenge if z¼ 0
HðFðelectionChallenge;z 1ÞÞ if z> 0
where H is a cryptographic hash function.
(c) The VST computes a set of verification codes wi by
applying the MarkPledge receipt creation
RCpkðbi; qi; si; di; cÞ ¼ hwi;uii function to the encrypted
vote entries (rotated ballot entries) cf. Section 3.1.
7Vote Receipt
Candidate Verification code
Alice 46R9
Bob QE41
Charles KNSY
Dharma PZ8R
Code Card
Confirmation Code
PZ8R
Candidate Vote code
Alice KPLE
Bob 49UI
Charles ZXA8
Dharma RCP3
VST
Encrypted 
vote
Vote receipt
verification 
d
RCP3a
Voter
c
RCP3  and
election challenge
bPC
Fig. 6 e Candidate selection and receipt verification overview. In this example the voter selects the candidate Dharma with
the vote code RCP3. Then, the VST creates the vote encryption and receipt and sends it to the PC, which displays the vote
receipt to the voter. The voter verifies the vote receipt by checking that the confirmation code on her code card (PZ8R) is the
verification code of the candidate Dharma in the vote receipt.
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known only to the VST, and the challenge generated
in the previous step to generate a verification code
for each candidate encryption and a proof of correct
generation (ui). The concatenation of the verification
codes and the corresponding proofs create the vote
receipt ðvoteReceipt ¼ jjki wiÞ and receipt validity
ðreceiptValidity ¼ jjki uiÞ data.
In order to ensure voter recorded-as-cast verifica-
tion, the challenge must not have been known at the
time of the ballot creation; however, because of this
requisite, the existence of two equal verification
codes in the receipt is a possibility. If this happens
the vote receipt is considered invalid and the VST
goes back to step (b). The probability of having an
invalid receipt after r attempts can be set as small as
desired (cf. Appendix B).
After creating thevote out of theballot and generating
the vote receipt and the respective validity data, theVST
signs the triplet (vote, voteReceipt, receiptValidity) and
sends it to the PC (stepⓒ in Fig. 6) that displays it to the
voter for confirmation (stepⓓ in Fig. 6).
5. PC/Ballot Box : fvote;voteReceipt; receiptValiditygV
If the voter confirms the correction of the receipt, by
checking that the confirmation code on her code card
matches the receipt’s verification code for the selected
candidate, the signed triplet is sent to the Ballot Box using
the PC Internet connection.
6. Ballot Box/BB : ffvote;vote Receipt; receipt ValiditygVgBallot Box
Ballot Box/PC/VST :
ffvote;vote Receipt; receipt ValiditygVgBallot Box
Upon the reception of the signed triplet the Ballot Box
verifies thevoteandcorresponding receiptcorrectness, using
the MarkPledge receipt validity ðRVpkÞ function (cf. Section
3.1) andverifies that theballot rotation that “creates” thevote
is in accordance with the vote receipt entries.Yki RVpkðcvotei; c;wi;uiÞ¼? True (3)If everything is OK, the Ballot Box signs the verified data
and publishes it in the public Bulletin Board. A copy is sent
back to the VST.
In order to simplify a second and independent receipt veri-
fication, thevotercanprint thereceiptandaskanIndependent
Organization to verify it. This verificationmaybe conductedat
any time, during or after the vote casting phase. In fact, every
vote and receipt pair are verified by Independent Organiza-
tions at the “public verification and vote counting phase”.
. EC/ BB: {electoralRoll, ballotList, voteList, receiptList}EC
Immediately after the vote casting period, the Electoral
Commission verifies all receipts validity data using the Mark-
PledgeRVpk function,similarlyto theBallotBoxverification (cf.
Eq. (3)). Then, the Electoral Commissionvalidates all votes and
receipts by publishing a signature over the list of all the voter-
ballot-vote-receipt associations.
Note that the Electoral Commission verification can be per-
formed in real time as the vote-receipt pairs get published in
the Bulletin Board, thus the message corresponding to this
step can be published without any further delay at the end of
the vote casting period.4.3.4. Public verification and vote counting phase
Finally, there is a public verification and vote counting phase
where the Trustees perform an anonymous homomorphic
vote tally computation. In this phase, anyone can verify all the
election public data, such as the ballots, the receipts validity
proofs and the election tally computation, without compro-
mising the voters privacy. Independent Organizations provide
Verification Services to allow the voter to perform an inde-
pendent verification of her vote receipt.
The public verification and vote counting phase has three
stages: i) election data verification, ii) vote tally, and iii) vote
tally verification.
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1. IOi/BB : felectoralRoll; ballotList;voteList; receiptListgIOi
Thisphase startswithafirst verificationofallpublicdataby
the various Independent Organizations. Each Independent
Organization (IOi) verifies the ballots validity and the corre-
sponding published votes and receipts, using the MP verifi-
cation functionsVVpk andRVpk (cf. Eq. (1) in the 3rd stepof the
ballot registration stage in the election registration phase and
Eq. (3) in the 6th step of the vote casting stage in the vote
casting phase). The Independent Organizations also verify
that there is only one YESvote in each ballot similarly to the
verificationperformedbytheElectionRegistrar instep3of the
ballot registration stage in the election registration phase (cf.
Eq. (2)).
Each Independent Organization publicly commits to the
election data verification by publishing a signature on the
Bulletin Board over all the voter-ballot-vote-receipt
associations.
2.
V/Verification Servicei : voterID
Verification Servicei/V : fverifiedReceiptgIOi
The voter can verify independently her vote receipt by
asking the Verification Service of any Independent Orga-
nization for a verified copy of her vote receipt. Then, the
voter should again check if the confirmation code on her
code card matches the verification value corresponding to
her chosen candidate on the vote receipt.
If any error is detected in this verification phase the
voter should be able to cast another vote. This solution is
already used in real world elections, e.g. the Estonian
electoral process (Estonian National Electoral Commitee,
2012) allows the voter to vote on a polling station at the
election day and override the electronic vote casted online.
Note also that any correction to the encrypted vote occurs
before the vote counting process and without revealing the
content of the encrypted vote, therefore preserving the
voter’s privacy.
4.3.4.2. Vote tally
1. EC/ BB: {homomorphicVotesAggregation}EC
The vote tally starts with the publication of the homo-
morphic aggregation, by the Electoral Commission, of all
the votes that were not protested by the voters. The
homomorphic vote aggregation is as described in Section
3.1.3 and aims to protect the voter’s individual privacy, i.e.
no individual vote is decrypted, only the votes aggregation
that is homomorphically computed.
2. T t/BB : fvoteTally;decryptionProofgT t
Then, a subset T t of at least t Trustees decrypts the
homomorphic votes aggregation in a verifiable way, cf.
Appendix A.1. The vote tally and the decryption proof are
then signed by the Trustees and published in the Bulletin
Board.
3. EC / BB: {homomorphicVotesAggregation, voteTally, decryp-
tionProof}EC
The Electoral Commission verifies the vote tally decryp-
tion proofs and validates it by publishing a signature link-
ing the homomorphic votes aggregation to the final vote
tally and decryption proof.4.3.4.3. Vote tally verification
1. IOi/BB :
fhomomorphicVotesAggregation; voteTally;decryptionProofgIOi
Each Independent Organization verifies the homomorphic
vote aggregation and vote tally decryption proofs, signs
everything and publishes the signature on the Bulletin Board.
The homomorphic vote tally aggregation can be verified just
by redoing the homomorphic sum (cf. Section 3.1.3). The
decryption proof is verified according to the threshold
decryption algorithm used (cf. Appendix A.1). Note that
anyone with sufficient knowledge and computational power
can verify all the election data as Independent Organizations
do. This is true because the verification is based only on public
information published in the Bulletin Board.
4.4. A note on the code card generation
Printing the code card while registering the ballot in the
election registration phase is convenient for the voter;
however, this means that, besides the voter and the VST, also
the PC used in the registration has access to the code card.
Thus, the registration PC can compromise the voter’s privacy
because it knows the confirmation code; therefore, it must be
trusted in the EVIV privacy trust model cf. Section 2.1.
Nevertheless, because the voter verifies her vote receipt using
a trusted independent organization, not even a collusion
between the registration PC and the vote casting PC is able to
compromise the vote-receipt verification soundness.
To better protect the voter’s privacy, the code card can be
generated using an independent (and offline) PC any time after
the voter’s ballot registration and before the beginning of the
vote casting phase.5. Protocol evaluation
This section discusses the EVIV properties introduced in
Section 2.1, for which we provide detailed proofs in Appendix
B. Additionally, we also discuss the coercion resistance limi-
tations of EVIV and, briefly, the EVIV properties that simplifies
the design of defenses against common network infrastruc-
ture attacks.
P1EVIV e No votes can be added, deleted or modified without
detection.
In EVIV an attacker (insider or not) cannot modify votes nor
add votes for abstaining voter’s because the votes and the
receipts are validated by the voter’s digital signature, i.e. it is
not possible to create a valid vote or receiptwithout the voter’s
VST. Given that the votes and the receipt are published in the
BB every voter can easily verify that her vote enters the tally
process, i.e. it is not deleted.
P2EVIV e Every vote is counted-as-recorded.
In EVIV every vote is counted-as-cast because it uses
a public verifiable homomorphic vote tally process.
P3EVIV e Every voter can verify that her vote is recorded-as-
intended with a soundness of ð1 2aÞr$ðk1Þ.
The vote and receipt are created and signed by the voter’s
VST; thus, only the VST and the PC (to which the VST is
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Assuming that thevoterhasaccess toacertified/verifiedvote
receipt, thecorrectuseof theMarkPledge technique in theEVIV
vote protocol allows the voter to identify any vote manipula-
tion by theVSTwith a soundness of ð1 2aÞr$ðk1Þ, cf. the proof
in Appendix B. The PC can also try tomodify the voter’s vote by
guessing a valid candidate vote code; however, given that it
cannot create a fake vote receipt (i.e. it cannot forge the voter’s
signature on a fake receipt) the voter easily detects the attack
by visually verifying the vote receipt.
P4EVIV e No one but the voter and her VST knows the voter’s
chosen candidate.
The encrypted vote, the vote receipt and the homomorphic
tally process data are all available in the BB and do not reveal
the voter’s vote intention. Assuming that the VST is honest,
there is an honest threshold of the election key holders and
that the code card is only known to the voter and herVST, then
we can say that no one but the voter and her VST knows the
voter’s chosen candidate.
Note that the VST is only considered honest to preserve the
voter’s privacy. As explained above, the EVIV integrity evalu-
ation considers the VST one not trusted system component.
5.1. Coercion and receipt freeness
EvenconsideringtheVSThonest for theprivacyevaluation,EVIV
is not coercion resistant nor receipt free because the voter can
provide a proof of her vote to a coercer/person. The proof is
simply thevoter’s codecard,namely theverificationcodeonher
code card. However, in EVIV the code card is not authenticated,
i.e. it is written on a paper by the voter or printed on demand by
thevoterusinga regularprinter andpaper; thus,aftervoting, the
code card is not a proof anymore, i.e. the voter can create a fake
code cardwith any verification code that appears on the receipt.
Moreover, althoughnot specified inSection 4.3, the EVIVsystem
canbeeasily extended to support vote recasting, given that both
the encrypted vote and receipt are public and authenticated by
the voter’s digital signature. In the EVIV case, and because the
vote receipt is public and authenticated, the vote recasting only
defeats weak forms of coercion and vote buying attacks.
5.2. Network infrastructure attacks
EVIV, as any other network protocol, may be subjected to
network infrastructure attacks. Although, EVIV does not
specify any security measures to counteract this type of
security attack, it possesses properties that may simplify the
design of such security measures.
DoS attacks against the election infrastructure with the
intent to lock-out one or several electors can be mitigated by
replicating the Election-Registrar and Ballot-Box services.
Given that these services are stateless and that every ballot or
vote submission is authenticated and, therefore allowing
revoting, most of the problems associated with replication
(Dini, 2003) do not exist and replication is easy.
Phishing for credentials or vote codes are ineffective in
EVIV and therefore do not require special defense mecha-
nisms. In fact, authentication credentials never leave the VST
and code votes can only be used by someone with the VST.
Spoofing the identity (DNS, IP, etc.) of election services is alsoineffective provided that at least one verification organization
is not spoofed (cf. integrity assumption AI2_EVIV).
6. Implementation results
This section discusses the implementation results regarding
the technical viability of EVIV, i.e. the performance of its
critical components. It starts by identifying the time-critical
operations in EVIV and then presents the results of a proto-
type implementation of such time-critical operations.
6.1. Time-critical operations
Given the cryptographic nature of EVIV, the time/computational
critical operations are those directly related to the vote encryp-
tion, receiptcreationandverification,andvotetallycomputation:
 Vote encryption and verification: VEpk and VVpk
 Receipt creation and verification: RCpk and RVpk
 Tally computation: Cpk and homomorphic tally computation
Fig. 7 shows a schematic view of the EVIV protocol, where it
is possible to identify the entity responsible for each crypto-
graphic operation and the dependencies between the crypto-
graphic operations.
The trustees are in charge of creating the election key pair
and deciphering the homomorphic vote aggregation. These
two operations are easily performed within a few seconds/
minutes (cf. Section 6.2).
Independent Organizations verify all the election’s public
data, namely: the election key pair creation, each vote’s
encryption, receipt and canonicalization, the homomorphic
tally aggregation and the homomorphic vote aggregation
decryption. These operations can be spanned across the entire
election period after the publication of the related data by the
Electoral Commission; therefore, provided that they can be
performed in a single day, usual minimum election period, we
consider the costs acceptable.
The Electoral Commission/election servers also verify all
the election’s public data; however, these verifications are
critical because thedatamust beverifiedbeforebeingaccepted
and published. The two most time critical operations are the
vote receipt verification and the election tally computation
(vote canonicalization, homomorphic aggregation and tally
decryption verification). The vote receipt verification time is
critical because the voter’s vote is only accepted after the
receipt verification, and the election tally time computation is
critical because everyone demands a fast tally output.
In EVIV each voter’sVST only has to create one vote/receipt
pair (VEpk andRCpk) however, we assume that theVST has very
limited computational capabilities and must do its computa-
tions in a human acceptable time. Our prototype implements
the VST as a smart card, cf. Section 6.2.1.
6.2. Prototype results
After the identification of the critical operations we have
implemented a prototype to evaluate the viability of EVIV,
using the MP3 ballot/receipt verification technique (cf. Section
3.1). The implementation uses the “standard” ElGamal setup
Fig. 7 e Schematic view of the EVIV protocol illustrating the time dependencies between the main cryptographic operations.
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primes such that qjp 1 (cf. Appendix A) more specifically, we
performed tests with the following ( p, q) setups: (1024, 160)
bits and (2048, 256) bits.
The machine we used to evaluate the performance of the
operations performed by Election Servers/Electoral Commis-
sion, Trustees and Independent Organizations has the
following setup: dual Nehalem chipset 5500 LE computer, with
two Quad Core Xeon at 2.0 GHz 4 MB Cache processors and
16 GB of RAM, running Linux 64 bits Ubuntu 2.6.32. The test
program is coded in Java, compiled to run in native code using
the GCJ 4.4.3 ahead-of-time compiler for the Java Language,
and run 8 threads. The tests were performed with a 10
candidates and 10,000 voters election setup. The VST, which
performs the vote encryption and creates the vote receipt is
implemented using smart cards (cf. Section 6.2.1).
Our implementation has only one trustee and therefore the
election key pair is a “regular” ElGamal key pair. Regarding the
vote counting phase, our tests show that the vote encryptionaggregation and the aggregation decryption takes just a few
seconds: the vote aggregation of 1million votes is performed in
less than 20 s and the decryption of the aggregation is per-
formed in less than 20 ms. The aggregation and decryption
times obtained allow us to estimate that the election results
can be computedwithin a few seconds orminutes, even taking
into account that the distributed decryption process time is
proportional to the number of trustees sharing the private key.
The other relevant cryptographic operations of the EVIV
protocol are the MarkPledge functions, which were imple-
mented accordingly to the MP3 specification (Joaquim and
Ribeiro, 2012). The vote verification ðVVpkÞ and receipt verifi-
cation ðRVpkÞ functions, which are performed by both the
Electoral Commission/election servers and the Independent
Organizations, are analyzed below. The vote encryption ðVEpkÞ
and receipt creation ðRCpkÞ functions, which are performed by
the VST, are analyzed separately in Section 6.2.1.
Table 1 and Figs. 8 and 9 show the server ðVVpkÞ and ðRVpkÞ
times per candidate and the total number of vote validations
Table 1e Server vote and receipt verification times for the
ElGamal ( p-q) parameters configurations of (1024-160)
bits and (2048-256) bits. Columns 2 and 3 show the per
candidate verification times, while columns 4e6 show
how many (million) votes and receipts verifications can
be performed in 24 h (with our server setup) in an election
with 10 candidates.
Parameters
( p-q) bits
1 candidate 10 candidates votes in 24 h
VVpk RVpk VVpk RVpk VVpk þRVpk
1024-160 292 ms 141 ms 29.59 M 61.28 M 19.95 M
2048-256 1346 ms 647 ms 6.42 M 13.35 M 4.34 M
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due to the MarkPledge technique, the total time per vote/
receipt is proportional to the number of candidates running in
the election. From the data shown it is possible to infer that in
the (2048-256) bits configuration, a server like ours, in an
election with 10 candidates, can perform about 70 vote vali-
dations or 150 receipt validations per second, which we
consider acceptable for the Electoral Commission/election
servers real time constrains. Using the same configuration,
Independent Organizations can perform a total of 4.34 million
validations in 24 h of both vote and receipts.
The times for weaker and outdated (1024-160) bits config-
uration are given to show the performance relation between
the two configurations. This data is important to the VST
performance analysis, given that there was no available off-
the-shelf developer smart cards supporting the (2048-256)0
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Fig. 8 e Vote and receipt verifications at the server over a 24 h pe
on the data presented in Table 1.bits configuration (cf. Section 6.2.1). On average the (2048-256)
bits configuration results are 4.6 times greater than the (1024-
160) bits configuration results.
6.2.1. VST prototype implementation results
The VST is a personal security token that, for convenience,
should be familiar to the voters. In our prototype the VST is
implemented as a smart card, similar to today bank cardswith
chip, electronic national id cards or electronic passports.
We have considered two smart card technologies for our
VST implementation, namely JavaCard (Oracle, 2012) and
MULTOS (MULTOS, 2012). Both JavaCard and MULTOS define
secure multi-application smart-card virtual machines with
a well defined application programing interface (API);
however, the JavaCard API is much more restricted and limits
the access to the smart card crypto-coprocessor functions. On
the other hand, the MULTOS offers a “lower” level API which
gives a broader access to the crypto-coprocessor capabilities,
including access to large integer modular arithmetic. Thus,
when it is necessary to prototype protocols with non standard
cryptographic operations (e.g. the MarkPledge candidate
encryptions) theMULTOS platform is the best choice (Joaquim
and Ribeiro, 2012; Mostowski and Vullers, 2011).
Our VST prototype is implemented in a MULTOS MC1-36K-
61 smart card with an Infineon SLE66 chip, in which we have
tested the vote creation VEpk and receipt creation RCpk func-
tions. Table 2 and Figs. 10 and 11 show the VEpk and RCpk
times. Although MULTOS smart cards are more flexible than
JavaCards, we were unable to get access to development cards
with 2048 bits “free” exponent modular exponentiation; the25 30 35 40 45 50
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exponentiation with a 32 bits exponent. Thus, the times
shown in Table 2 are real times for the (1024-160) bits config-
uration and estimated for the (2048-256) bits configuration in
a similar hardware (more details below).
As expected, the receipt creation is much faster than the
vote encryption. In our development cards the receipt creation
function, which is necessary to perform during the usually
short vote casting period, takes only 0.065 s in the (1024-160)
bits configuration and is estimated to take about 0.267 s in the
(2048-256) bits configuration, which allows to create a vote
receipt in less than 3 s for an election with 10 running candi-
dates. The vote encryption, which is performed in the electionTable 2e Per candidate vote encryption ðVEpkÞ and receipt
creationRCpk times in aMULTOSMC1-36K-61 smart card,
for the ElGamal ( p-q) parameters configurations of (1024-
160) bits and (2048-256) bits. The (2048-456) bits
configuration times are estimated to be about 4.13 the
times of the (1024-160) bits configuration.
Parameters ( p-q) 1 candidate
VEpk RCpk
cvote voteValidity Total
1024-160 1.2 s 1.6 s 2.8 s 0.065 s
2048-256a 4.9 s 6.6 s 11.5 s 0.267 s
a The (2048-256) bits configuration times are an estimative.registration phase, prior to the election day, takes 2.8 s in the
(1024-160) bits configuration and is estimated to take about
11.5 s in the (2048-256) bits configuration; thus, it would take
about 2 min to encrypt a vote for an election with 10 running
candidates. In addition, it is important to note that the time
constrains in the election registrationphaseare looser because
this phase can span over a larger period of time (a few weeks).
Given that therewas no availableMULTOSdeveloper smart
card able to support the (2048-256) bits configuration we did
some tests to confirm the around 4 factor between configu-
rations observed in the server times, cf. Section 6.2. Our tests
consisted in implementing the modular exponentiation, for
both configurations, using a mix of direct hardware functions
and software. It was implemented the “exponentiation by
squaring” algorithm given its simplicity and the availability of
a direct modular multiplication function up to 2048 bits. Table
3 shows the times obtained and the estimative for the hard-
ware only modular exponentiation times. The times obtained
show a factor of 4.1 between the two configurations, which is
in line with the 4.6 factor observed in our server times.
Although not available as a developer card, there are
MULTOS cards with more powerful hardware, which,
accordingly to the analysis in Mostowski and Vullers (2011),
could cut the times by 30% in the 1024 bits configuration and
present a factor of 2 to 2.5 when going from 1024 bits to
2048 bits (RSA) exponentiations. Considering the study pre-
sented in Mostowski and Vullers (2011) and our times for the
(1024-160) bits configuration we expect that, with the (2048-
256) bits configuration, a single candidate vote encryption can
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Table 3 e Modular exponentiation times in a MULTOS
MC1-36K-61 smart card. The hardware times use the API
modular exponentiation function. The hardware &
software times reflect our implementation of themodular
multiplication algorithm “exponentiation by squaring”
using the hardware assisted modular multiplication
function.
Modular multiplication
Parameters ( p-q) Hardware Hardware & software
1024-160 72 ms 1940 ms
2048-256 296 msa 7970 ms
a Time estimative.
c om p u t e r s & s e c u r i t y 3 2 ( 2 0 1 3 ) 1 7 0e1 9 1186be done in about 5 s in a state-of-the-art smart card, thus
taking about 50 s to encrypt a full 10 candidates vote.7. Related work
Private, correct and verifiable elections were always the goal
of the electronic voting research efforts which started about
30 years ago. The resulting voting protocols can be roughly
categorized into three main categories accordingly to the vote
anonymization technique used: mix-nets (Chaum, 1981; Juels
et al., 2005; Furukawa et al., 2010), blind signatures (Chaum,
1988; Ohkubo et al., 1999; Joaquim et al., 2003) and homo-
morphic voting systems (Cohen and Fischer, 1985; Cramer
et al., 1997; Juels et al., 2005; Kiayias et al., 2006).
Usually vote protocols assume a “cryptographic capable”
voter, however the incapacity of a common voter to perform
cryptographic operations means that the voter must trust the
vote client machine to perform the voter’s side cryptography,
e.g. the vote encryption. This fact and the vulnerability of
current Internet “architecture/infrastructure”, which exposes
the voter’s computer to many threats, e.g. a computer virus
aiming to undetectably change the voter’s vote, is one of the
main arguments against the adoption of Internet voting
(Jefferson et al., 2004; Dagstuhl Accord, 2007).
In 2004, with the work of Chaum (2004) and Neff (2004),
a newparadigm in electronic voting researchhas emerged: E2E
voting systems. The goal of an E2E voting system is to incor-
porate both voter cast-as-intended verification and universal
counted-as-recorded verification mechanisms to allow theTable 4 e Comparison between EVIV characteristics and other
Highly sound voter cast-as-intended verification
Cast-as-intended verification resistant to the collusion of all system
components
Protects voter’s privacy from a compromised voting PC
Voters’ privacy is not broken by a simple collusion of system component
Universal tally verification
Full voter’s mobility
Strong voter’s authenticationelection’s integrity verification based only on publicly pub-
lished data. The E2E voting systems were initially proposed to
the poll station voting environment (Chaum, 2004; Popoveniuc
and Hosp, 2010; Chaum et al., 2005; Neff, 2004; Adida and Neff,
2006; Moran and Naor, 2006; Benaloh, 2006; Rivest and Smith,
2007; Chaum et al., 2008a,b). Later, some of the ideas were
used to develop E2E Internet voting systems.
The Helios voting system was the first E2E Internet voting
system (Adida, 2008). Helios borrows the cast-as-intended
verification mechanism of Benaloh (2006), where the voter is
allowed to create n votes and verify n  1, achieving a sound-
ness of 1  1/n. Although the Helios cast-as-intended verifi-
cation mechanism resists to the collusion of all system
components, it is easy to explore a mix of social engineering
and vote client PC vulnerabilities to bypass it (Estehghari and
Desmedt, 2010; Heiderich et al., 2012).
Another E2E voting system proposed for the Internet is the
Scratch, Click and Vote (SCV) system (Kutyłowski and
Zago´rski, 2010). SCV provides a mix-net universal vote count
and uses the voter cast-as-intended verification ideas of
Popoveniuc and Hosp (2010), Chaum et al. (2005) and Rivest
and Smith (2007) with a “blind signature glue”. The SCV
cast-as-intended mechanism has a soundness of 1  1/4k,
where k is the number of candidates. The cast-as-intended
verification mechanism and the privacy of the voter can be
broken if the two election servers of SCV collude.
The remaining three Internet E2E voting systems we are
aware of (Ryan and Teague, 2009; Joaquim et al., 2009; Heiberg
et al., 2010) use a code voting (Chaum, 2001; Oppliger, 2002)
style voter interaction, combined with some cryptographic
techniques to provide privacy and voter recorded-as-intended
verification.
The Pretty Good Democracy (PGD) achieves E2E verifiability
byenhancing a codevotingprotocolwith some ideasused in the
Chaum et al. (2008a) and Chaum et al. (2005) systems. PGD have
some coercion resistance (receipt-freeness) at the cost of a vote
verification mechanism that can be bypassed by a collusion of
two election servers. The PGD system was later enhanced to
support expressive voting schemes in which the voter lists the
candidates in order of preference (Heather et al., 2010).
The VeryVote system (Joaquim et al., 2009) combines the
code voting approach with the highly sound Neff (2004) cast-
as-intended verification mechanism (MarkPledge). The cast-
as-intended verification mechanism used in VeryVote offers
a soundness of 1  k!/2a, where a is a configurable securityInternet E2E voting systems.
Internet E2E
Helios (v3) PGD VeryVote SCV Heiberg et al. EVIV
  U  U U
U  U   U
 U U U  U
s U U    U
U U U U U U
U     U
    U U
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number of candidates. In VeryVote all vote encryptions are
prepared by the election server which, consequently, must be
trusted to ensure the voter’s privacy.
In the Heiberg et al. (2010) system, which uses only verifi-
cation/confirmation codes, each verification code is generated
by a cooperation of two servers in order to protect the privacy
of the voters. The soundness of the cast-as-intended verifi-
cation mechanism depends on the size of verification code
and can be as high as desired. In this system the privacy of the
voter is broken if the two election servers collude, and the
cast-as-intended verification mechanism can be broken if
both the two elections servers and the vote casting PC collude.
Norway (Gjsteen, 2012) uses a similar system, although due to
privacy/coercion concerns not enough data is made public,
which makes it not E2E verifiable.
With the exception of Helios, all other E2E Internet voting
systems require the delivery of a code card to the voter prior to
the election, e.g. by postal. As can be seen in Table 4, none of
the described E2E voting protocols has all the properties
of EVIV.8. Conclusions and future work
EVIV gives the voter full mobility and offers strong integrity
guarantees allied with privacy measures that allow the voter
to vote privately in public PCs, such as a PC at a cybercafe´ or at
a public library. Moreover, the EVIV protocol does not requires
auditing computer systems, only the data produced by them,
i.e. the correction of the code executed by each service can be
verified by checking the output of the election, given that
every result has a correspondent public proof of correctness.
In the distributed voter’s privacymodel of EVIV no entity is
able to break the voters privacy since each encrypted vote is
created by each voter’sVST (voter security token). Therefore, if
an attacker wants to know who voted for who, the attacker
must perform a large scale attack to the PCs used to create the
vote codes. This attack can be made virtually impossible by
allowing the voter to create her vote codes from an off-line PC;
although, this does not provide protection against coercion/
vote buying attacks, in which the voter gives/sells her code
card to the coercer/vote buyer. A very important futurework is
to consider the integration of strong anti coercion mecha-
nisms in EVIV.
The voter cast-as-intended verification in EVIV is highly
sound and requires the voter to performonly thematch of two
small 4e5 alphanumeric strings. More precisely, the sound-
ness of the voter cast-as-intended verification is
ð1 2aÞr$ðk1Þ, where k is the number of running candidates
and a and r are configurable security parameters usually set to
values between 20 and 30, and 1 and 5, respectively.
Our prototype implementation shows that there should
not be any problem with the computational demands of the
vote protocol at the servers side. However, the assumed VST
limited computational capabilities limits the use of EVIV to
elections with a small number of candidates. This problem
should be addressed in the future, e.g. using elliptic curve
cryptography.Another important future work is to test the usability of
EVIV and extend its application range by enhancing the voter
cast-as-intended verification mechanism in order to support
multiple candidate selection and candidate ranking with the
same high soundness.
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Appendix A. The ElGamal cryptosystem
For completeness, this appendix describes the well known
ElGamal cryptosystem that is used in the MarkPledge specifi-
cations and consequently in EVIV. The ElGamal cryptosystem
works in the Zp subgroup Gq of order q, where p and q are large
primes such that qjp 1. Both primes p, q and a generator g of
Gq are public parameters of the system. The ElGamal key pair
consists of a private key s and the corresponding public key
h ¼ pk ¼ gs mod p. The private key s is a randomly chosen
integer such that 0 < s < q. Algorithms to generate secure
ElGamal parameters can be found in (NIST, 2009).
In the ElGamal cryptosystem, amessagem˛Gq is encrypted
by selecting a random integer value r˛Zq, and constructing the
following pair EGhðm; rÞ ¼ hx; yi ¼ hgr mod p;hr$mmod pi. To
recover the message m one computes m ¼ y/xs.
The EVIV protocol uses an ElGamal variant known as
exponential ElGamal (Cramer et al., 1997). In exponential
ElGamal the message to encrypt m is chosen from Zq and it is
encrypted as gm, instead of m, in order to respect the ElGamal
message space, i.e. Ehðm; rÞ ¼ EGhðgm; rÞ. The exponential
ElGamal has the following homomorphisms (we have omitted
the mod p notation from the equations):
Additive homomorphism between two encryptions
Ehðm1; r1Þ4Ehðm2; r2Þ ¼ hgr1 ;hr1$gm1 i$hgr2 ;hr2$gm2 i
¼ hgr1$gr2 ;hr1$gm1$hr2$gm2 i
¼ gr1þr2 ;hr1þr2$gm1þm2
¼ Ehððm1 þm2Þmod q; ðr1 þ r2Þmod qÞ (4)
Multiplicative homomorphism between an encryption and
a value n
Ehðm; rÞ5n ¼ hgr;hr$gmin¼
ðgrÞn; ðhrÞn$ðgmÞn ¼ hgr,n;hr,n$gm,ni
¼ Ehððm$nÞmod q; ðr$nÞmod qÞ
(5)A.1. Threshold ElGamal
Cryptographic vote protocols in general, and EVIV in partic-
ular, share the private key of the election among a set of
trustees to protect the voter’s privacy. In EVIV, the election
private key is shared, among a set of n trustees, in such a way
that to decrypt a message it is necessary the collaboration of
c om p u t e r s & s e c u r i t y 3 2 ( 2 0 1 3 ) 1 7 0e1 9 1188t  n trustees. In Cramer et al. (1997) the reader can find more
details on how to create a (t, n)-threshold election key pair, for
the ElGamal cryptosystem, and how to decrypt a message
using the shared private key.Appendix B. EVIV integrity and privacy proofs
This section presents the sketch proofs for the following four
EVIV properties, early described in Section 2:
P1EVIV e No votes can be added, deleted or modified without
detection.
P2EVIV e Every vote is counted-as-recorded.
P3EVIV e Every voter can verify that her vote is recorded-as-
intended with a soundness of ð1 2aÞr$ðk1Þ.
P4EVIV e No one but the voter and her VST knows the voter’s
chosen candidate.
where a is the security parameter that defines the domain Z2a
of several important protocol parameters: the challenge c, the
confirmation (commit) code q and the verification code w.6 r is
the number of challenges that the VST can use; and, k is the
number of candidates running in the election.
The EVIV proofs use the privacy and integrity trust models
defined in Section 2.1 and the following vote and receipt val-
idity definitions:
Definition 1. A vote is valid if it is the concatenation of k cvotes, one
of type YESvote and k  1 of type NOvote, corresponding to the
voter’s registered and published ballot.
Definition 2. A receipt is correct, with respect to a specific
vote ¼ cvote1k.kcvotek, if it is the concatenation of the corre-
sponding k verification codes, i.e. w1k.kwk.
Definition 3. A receipt is valid if it is correct and every verification
code in it is unique.
B.1. EVIV integrity proofs
Theorem 1. (P1EVIV) No votes can be added, deleted or modified
without detection.
Proof Sketch. In EVIV only the voter can cast a vote because
the vote is only considered for the election tally if it has the
voter’s signature on it, which is performed by the voter’s VST.
For the same reason no vote can be modified, as it would
invalidate the voter’s signature on it.
The Electoral Commission signs, and publishes in the
Bulletin Board, the vote-receipt list at the end of the vote
casting phase, which locks the valid votes accepted for the
election tally. Additionally, Independent Organizations also
verify the contents of the Bulletin Board and provide a verifi-
cation service to the voters.6 This assumption makes the proof valid for every MarkPledge
specification; although, as explained in Section 3.1.2 when using
MP3 the a parameter only defines the voter’s view on those
values, which does not affect the soundness of the voter
recorded-as-intended verification.Thus, in EVIV no votes can be added, deleted or modified
without detection, in any phase of the protocol.
Theorem 2. Every publicly recorded vote is valid.
Proof Sketch. Provided that MarkPledge is not flawed the
VVpk function attests that a cvote is either a YESvote or aNOvote,
to anyone knowing the correspondent voteValidity data.
After the election registration phase, every cvotei and
voteValidityi comprising a ballot are public, thus, anyone may
use the VVpk to verify that every cvotei in the ballot is either
a YESvote or a NOvote. Given that the sumValidity data also
becomes public after the election registration phase, every
one may attest that only one of the cvotes, in the ballot is
a YESvote.
In EVIV the final vote is a simple rotation of the ballot
entries, i.e. one of its entries is a YESvote and all other entries
are NOvotes. Thus, if a ballot is valid the vote is also valid.
Lemma 1. Every published vote is valid and suitable for homo-
morphic aggregation.
Proof Sketch. Given that every public vote is valid (Theorem
2) and that by definition every valid vote contains one well
formed YESvote and k  1 well formed NOvotes, the vote is
suitable for homomorphic tally if the output of the canon-
icalization function Cpk is, which is the case for all MarkPledge
specifications (Joaquim and Ribeiro, 2012).
Theorem 3. (P2EVIV) Every vote is counted-as-recorded.
Proof Sketch. EVIV uses a homomorphic vote count
process. Since the homomorphic aggregation of the encrypted
votes is a public operation everyone can perform/verify it. The
decryption process of the homomorphic aggregation result is
also public verifiable, because it produces public proofs of
correct decryption.
Given that no vote can be deleted after being published
(Theorem 1), there is at least one honest Independent Orga-
nization verifying the election public data (AI2_EVIV), and the
votes are suitable for the homomorphic aggregation (Lemma
1) every vote is counted-as-recorded.
Lemma 2. Every publicly recorded receipt is correct with respect to
a valid vote.
Proof Sketch. Provided that MP is not flawed the RVpk
function attests the correct computation of every verification
code wi from the corresponding pair hcvotei; ci.
Given that, after the vote casting phase, the challenge c and
every verification code wi, receipt validity ui and cvotei are
public data, anyone can verify that each verification code wi in
the receipt was correctly computed from the reordered ballot
entries that compose the vote.
Lemma 3. The challenge used by RCpk function is uniformly
distributed and could not be predicted before being generated by the
trustees.
Proof Sketch. Given that there is at least one honest trustee
(AI1_EVIV), the protocol (cf. Section 3.2) used to generate the
challenge ensures that the challenge is fresh and cannot be
predicted.
Lemma 4. The challenge is generated after the commitment of the
confirmation code and vote encryption entries.
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vote encryption entries are committed in the election regis-
tration phase. The YESvote verification code is printed as the
confirmation code on the voter’s code card and the vote
encryption entries (cvotes) are the ballot entries which are
published at the end of election registration phase. Under
assumptionAI1_EVIV, only when the election registration phase
ends, at the vote casting phase initialization, the elec-
tionChallenge is created by the trustees. Consequently, the
challenge is generated after the commitment of the confir-
mation codes and vote encryption entries.
Lemma 5. Every verification code computed with RCpk function in
EVIV is a randomly uniform distributed variable.
Proof Sketch. There are two “types” of verification codes, the
ones created from YESvotes and the ones created from NOvotes.
The verification codes ðwiÞ computed from YESvotes are equal to
the embedded confirmation codes ðwi ¼ qiÞ that, by definition,
are uniformly distributed random numbers. The verification
codes computed from NOvotes are uniform distributed random
numbersaccordingwiththeMarkPledgeRCpk function,provided
that the challenge c is a uniformrandomnumber (Lemma3) and
not known at the time of theNOvotes creation (Lemma 4).
Theorem 4. Every vote and challenge combination has a, public
verifiable, probabilistic valid receipt.
Proof Sketch. A receipt is valid if it is correct and every
verification code wi in it is unique. Under Definition 2 a receipt
computed with the RVpk function is correct and can be
publicly proven under Lemma 2. However, because the chal-
lenge value is not know at the time of the ballot entries and
confirmation code commitment (Lemma 4) it is possible the
existence of two equal verification codes in the receipt.
Given that in MarkPledge 3, every verification code is
a uniform random variable (Lemma 5) distributed over the
MarkPledge code space ([0, 2a[), the probability of having two
colliding verification codes (i.e. an invalid receipt) is given by
the birthday paradox probability piz1 ek,ðk1Þ=2aþ1 .
In MarkPledge 1 and 2 it is not possible to have two
colliding NOvotes verification codes, thus the probability that
none of the k  1 NOvotes verification codes in a receipt
matches the YESvote verification code is ð1 2aÞðk1Þ, and the
probability of having an invalid receipt is given by
pi ¼ 1 ð1 2aÞðk1Þ.
Because the VSTmay extract the verification codes several
times the probability that it finds a valid receipt, after
a maximum of r attempts, is pv ¼ 1  ( pi)r. From pv it is clear
that the probability of success can bemade as high as required
by increasing the maximum number of attempts r.
Given that the receipt is public anyone may verify that
every verification code in it is unique.
Theorem 5. For a valid hvote; receipti pair the EVIV verification
process, of the voter intention, is sound with probability
p ¼ ð1 2aÞr$ðk1Þ, where k is the number of candidates, a the
security parameter of MarkPledge and, r the maximum number of
attempts to generate a valid receipt.
Proof Sketch. Just prove the opposite. The verification
process is not sound,with probability q¼ 1 p, if the votermay
be fooled into believe that she voted in one candidate and theYESvote entry is in another candidate. Given that the receipt is
valid, i.e. every verification code wi is different and was
computed fromthecorresponding cvotei, the onlyway that that
can happen is if the VST guesses the verification code of one of
theNOvotes in thevote.However, byMarkPledgeRCpk function,
before knowing the value of the challenge c (Lemma 4), the
verification codesof theNOvotesareuniformlydistributed over
the MarkPledge code space ([0,2a[). Therefore the probability
that a dishonest VST is able to guess at least one of the k  1
verification codes of NOvotes is given by q0 ¼ 1 ð1 2aÞk1,
and theprobability that it isable toguessat leastoneof thek1
verification codes of NOvotes in one of the r attempts of the
receipt generation is q ¼ 1 ð1 2aÞr$ðk1Þ.
Theorem 6. (P3EVIV) Every voter can verify that her vote is
recorded-as-intended with a soundness of ð1 2aÞr$ðk1Þ.
Proof Sketch. Given that votes cannot be removed or
altered after publication (Theorem 1) and there is at least one
honest Independent Organization (AI2_EVIV), which is able to
perform the public validation of votes and receipts, then every
voter has access to her vote and vote receipt and is assured of
their validity (Theorems 2 and 4, respectively). Finally, under
Theorem 5, the voter is able to identify the YESvote entry in the
vote receipt with a soundness ð1 2aÞr$ðk1Þ.
B.2. EVIV privacy proofs
Lemma 6. The ballot creation process preserves the voter’s privacy.
Proof Sketch. Provided that MarkPledge is not flawed, and
under assumptions AP2_EVIV, neither the MarkPledge technique
nor theVST create implicit channels; therefore, theonlyoutputs
of theballot creationprocessare theballotandtheballotvalidity
data, which do not reveal the position of the YESvote.
Lemma 7. The vote casting process preserves the voter’s privacy.
Proof Sketch. Provided that MarkPledge is not flawed, and
under assumptions AP2_EVIV, neither the MarkPledge technique
nor the VST create implicit channels, therefore the only infor-
mation disclosed in the vote casting process is the vote code of
the selected candidate to the PC and to the VST, and the vote
and vote receipt to the public. Assuming again thatMarkPledge
is not flawedneither the vote nor the receipt reveal theposition
of the YESvote without being decrypted. Under assumption
AP3_EVIV only the voter and her VST know the association
between each candidate and the vote code on the voter’s code
card. Therefore, revealing the vote code of the selected candi-
date does not reveal the identity of the selected candidate.
Lemma 8. The vote and receipt validity verifications preserve the
voter’s privacy.
Proof Sketch. The only output of the vote and receipt val-
idity verifications is a true or false value indicating if the vote
and receipt are valid.
Lemma 9. The voter cast-as-intended verification process preserves
the voter’s privacy.
Proof Sketch. The voter verifies her vote by visually
checking that the confirmation code is the verification code
associated to the chosen candidate in the vote receipt. Since
no data is generated by the cast-as-intended verification
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(assumption AP3_EVIV) the voter cast-as-intended verification
process preserves the voter’s privacy.
Lemma 10. The vote tabulation process preserves the voter’s
privacy.
Proof Sketch. The security of the ElGamal cryptosystem
and AP1_EVIV guarantees that no individual vote is decrypted.
Only the homomorphically aggregated sum of the encrypted
votes gets decrypted by the trustees. Therefore, the privacy of
the individual voter is preserved by the vote counting process.
All tabulation data concerning the homomorphic aggregation
and election tally decryption is already public.
Theorem 7. (P4EVIV) No one but the voter and her VST knows the
voter’s chosen candidate.
Proof Sketch. Lemmas 6e10 prove that, with the exception
of the vote code used to communicate the voter’s choice to the
VST, all data generated by the voting process is already public
and preserves the voter’s privacy. Lemma 7 attest that even
the vote code, used to choose the candidate, can be made
public without compromising the voter’s privacy. Addition-
ally, Lemmas 6e10 under the EVIV privacy trust model prove
that there is no privacy risk in any election phase:
 By privacy assumption AP3_EVIV and Lemma 6 there is no
privacy risk in the election registration phase.
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 By Lemmas 8e10 there in no privacy risk in the public
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Therefore it is possible to conclude that, under the EVIV
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